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Germline Genetic Modification and
5
Identity: the Mitochondrial and
Nuclear Genomes
Rosamund Scott and Stephen Wilkinson*
Abstract—In a legal ‘first’, the UK removed a prohibition against modifying
10 embryos in human reproduction, to enable mitochondrial replacement techniques
(MRTs), a move the Government distanced from ‘germline genetic modification’,
which it aligned with modifying the nuclear genome. This paper (1) analyzes the
uses and meanings of this term in UK/US legal and policy debates; and (2)
evaluates related ethical concerns about identity. It shows that, with respect to
15 identity, MRTs and nuclear genome editing techniques such as CRISPR/Cas-9
(now a policy topic), are not as different as has been supposed. While it does not
follow that the two should be treated exactly alike, one of the central reasons
offered for treating MRTs more permissively than nuclear genetic modification,
and for not regarding MRTs as ‘germline genetic modification’, is thereby in
20 doubt. Identity cannot, by itself, do the work thus far assigned to it, explicitly or
otherwise, in law and policy.
Keywords: CRISPR/Cas-9, genetic modification, genome editing, germline,
identity, mitochondrial replacement
25 1. Introduction
When, in 2015, the UK Parliament passed regulations permitting the use of
mitochondrial replacement techniques (MRTs) to prevent the transmission of
serious mitochondrial disease,
1
a long-standing prohibition against modifying
* Respectively, Professor of Medical Law and Ethics and Co-Director, Centre of Medical Law and Ethics,
Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College London, rosamund.scott@kcl.ac.uk; Professor of Bioethics,
Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster University, s.wilkinson2@lancaster.ac.uk. The
authors jointly hold a Wellcome Trust Senior Investigator Award entitled ‘The Donation and Transfer of Human
Reproductive Materials’, 2013-18 (Grant No 097894/Z/11/Z) and would like to thank the Trust for its support of
their research. They are also grateful to participants at their Wellcome Trust funded symposium ‘The Ethics of
Mitochondrial Replacement’, 10 and 11 September 2015, King’s College London, for comments on an earlier
draft, as well as to the referees for this journal.
1 The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Mitochondrial Donation) Regulations 2015 (the Regulations);
entry into force 29 October 2015; foreshadowed in the 2008 revisions to the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology (HFE) Act 1990, as discussed below. Approximately 1 in 6,500 children are born each year in the
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embryos in the course of in vitro fertilisation (IVF) was removed for the first
time in the world, accompanied by recognition of the heritability of such
modifications.2 The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Mitochondrial
Donation) Regulations 2015 (the Regulations) were against the backdrop of
5 various international statements and conventions which take a cautious or
prohibitive stance towards germline genetic intervention, as well as widespread
international prohibition.3 While several concerns, notably regarding risk,4
underlie these cautious or prohibitive approaches, a fundamental one is the
supposed wrongness of altering the ‘identities’ of future people. Perhaps not
10 surprisingly then, but nonetheless somewhat curiously, the UK Government
emphasized that while MRTs ‘do result in germ-line modification . . . the
techniques [do not] constitute genetic modification’.5 Subsequently, early in
2016, a US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) commissioned report of an
ad hoc committee of the US Institute of Medicine (IOM) held that MRTs do
15 constitute genetic modification and that, since mitochondria are maternally
inherited, MRTs also amount to germline modification if female offspring are
born. Despite this strikingly different conclusion, the report adopted a
cautiously permissive approach to MRTs (although a section in a federal
statute passed shortly before publication of the IOM Report, and subject to
UK with ‘a serious mitochondrial DNA disorder’, often resulting in ‘the premature death of children, painful
debilitating and disabling suffering, long-term ill-health and low quality of life’. DH, Mitochondrial Donation:
Government Response to the Consultation on Draft Regulations to Permit the Use of New Treatment Techniques to Prevent
the Transmission of a Serious Mitochondrial Disease from Mother to Child (July, 2014) 5.
2 The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) itself observed that ‘[i]f mitochondria
replacement were to be made available for treatment in the UK, it would be the first time that modified embryos
were used to make a child. The resulting child will have inherited nuclear DNA from its parents and
mitochondrial DNA from a donor.’ HFEA, Mitochondria Replacement Consultation: Advice to Government (March,
2013) para 2.12 (emphasis added).
3 Discussed in s 2 below. However a US team of doctors, led by Dr Zhang, carried out an MRT procedure in
a New York clinic, without applying for Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval, despite apparently contrary
recommendations of the American Medical Association (AMA) regarding international research; they then
undertook embryo transfer to the intending mother in an affiliated Mexican clinic. See further Mina Alikani and
others, ‘First Birth Following Spindle Transfer for Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy: Hope and Trepidation’
(2017) 34(4) Reproductive BioMedicine Online, 333-336, esp 333 and 335, who state that ‘although the
requirements for IRB review and approval . . . were generally met, the shortcomings . . . may be considered
significant’, 333, with various citations including AMA (2010) 12 AMA J Ethics 190-191. The subsequent birth
was announced in the latter half of 2016: New Scientist, 27 September 2016, in which the baby was reported as
five months’ old: https://www.newscientist.com/article/2107219-exclusive-worlds-first-baby-born-with-new-3-
parent-technique, last accessed 31 May 2017. Regarding the legal situation in Mexico, see Ce´sar Palacios-
Gonza´lez, ‘The Mexican Mitochondrial Fiasco’ (2016) 871 Bionews 28 September 2016, http://www.bionews.
org.uk/page_707057.asp, last accessed 31 May 2017; Ce´sar Palacios-Gonza´lez and Medina-Arellano Marı´a de
Jesu´s, ‘Mitochondrial Replacement Techniques and Mexico’s Rule of Law: On the Legality of the First Maternal
Spindle Transfer Case’ (2017) Journal of Law and the Biosciences, 1-20 doi:10.1093/jlb/lsw065; and Tetsuya
Ishii, ‘Mitochondrial Replacement Techniques and Mexico’s Rule of Law: On the Legality of the First Maternal
Spindle Transfer Case’ (2017) Journal of Law and the Biosciences, 1-7, doi:10.1093/jlb/lsx015.
4 See eg Janet Malek, ‘Understanding Risks and Benefits in Research on Reproductive Genetic Technologies’
(2007) 32(4) J Med Philos 339-358 for discussion of the complexity of the risk/benefit ratio.
5 DH (n 1) 15, emphases added. Note the definition of ‘germline’ as ‘[t]he sequence of cells that give rise to
sperm or egg cells that will pass genetic information on to a child’, in HFEA Review Panel, Third Scientific Review
of the Safety and Efficacy of Methods to Avoid Mitochondrial Disease through Assisted Conception: 2014 update (June,
2014) 53.
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annual renewal, currently bars an FDA decision on the safety and efficacy of
MRTs).6
Given the significance of the legal developments in the UK and the prospect
of the US and other countries moving permissively to regulate MRTs,7 this
5 paper has two aims: first, to analyze the uses and meanings of ‘germline genetic
modification’ in the UK and US legal and policy debates; second, to evaluate
ethical concerns about ‘identity’ raised by MRTs. The analysis has implications
for policy debates regarding the reproductive use of nuclear genome editing
techniques, such as CRISPR/Cas-9,8 that have now begun in earnest.9
6 Institute of Medicine, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Mitochondrial
Replacement Techniques: Ethical, Social, and Policy Considerations (National Academies Press, 2016) doi:
10.17226/21871. But note that the Report recommended (contrary to the UK position) that MRTs should
only be used to create male offspring, until sufficient post-birth information regarding the safety of the techniques
has been collected, however long this may take, 13. The section in the federal statute referred to is s 749 of the
Consolidated Appropriation Act of 2016, passed in December 2015, which states: ‘None of the funds made
available by this Act may be used to notify a sponsor or otherwise acknowledge receipt of a submission for an
exemption for investigational use of a drug or biological product under section 505(i) of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355(i)) or section 351(a)(3) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C.
262(a)(3)) in research in which a human embryo is intentionally created or modified to include a heritable
genetic modification. Any such submission shall be deemed to have not been received by the Secretary, and the
exemption may not go into effect.’ See further Eli Y Adashi and I Glenn Cohen, ‘Mitochondrial Replacement
Therapy: Unmade in the USA’, (2017) 317(6) JAMA 574-575, who note that as a result ‘absent an FDA ruling
on the safety and efficacy of mitochondrial replacement therapy, clinical application is and remains
impermissible’, 574; that ‘[t]he moratorium on mitochondrial replacement therapy constitutes an appropri-
ation-dependent policy rider that has to be annually renewed to remain in effect’, 575; and that: ‘The
congressional record is mum on the identity of the sponsor or sponsors of the ban, and the precise motives for
crafting it remain equally uncertain. The ban’s enactment was all but guaranteed by the complete absence of
discussion before its passage or at any time thereafter, and by its inclusion in a must-pass omnibus appropriation
bill.’ Ibid.
7 As the IOM report notes, although ‘[m]odification of the human germline . . . is legal in the United States . . .
several regulatory barriers have effectively prevented it from being carried out in many settings’. Ibid 62. On the
complexities of the US position, see ch 4 of the report. Since July 2001, ‘the Center for Biologics Evaluation and
Research (CBER) of the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) [has] exercised its jurisdiction over ‘‘cell and
gene therapy products’’ and informed ART clinics of a requirement for an Investigational New Drug (IND)
application for ‘‘therapy involving the transfer of genetic material by means other than the union of gamete
nuclei’’’. Alikani and others (n 3) 335. Regarding the MRT conducted in the US (n 3), Dr Zhang’s team ‘shared
with RBMO editors a pre-IND review request to the FDA, in which they described their past work and desire to
continue to offer MRT to selected patients in the USA. However, bound by the December 2015 statute [above
(n 6)], the FDA apparently declined the investigators’ request to meet or consider their application’ (ibid).
8 Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats.
9 See eg the Council of Europe’s Committee on Bioethics, ‘Statement on Genome Editing Technologies’, 2
December 2015, DH-BIO/INF (2015) 13, 2, in which it suggests that the issues raised by CRISPR/Cas-9 could
be examined with reference to the principles in the Oviedo Convention, discussed below, and also signals its
intention to examine the issues itself; Nuffield Council on Bioethics (NCoB), Genome Editing: An Ethical Review
(2016), especially s 4 regarding somatic and reproductive uses in humans; and, in particular, the NCoB’s
establishment of a new Working Party on ‘genome editing and human reproduction’: http://nuffieldbioethics.org/
project/genome-editing/working-party/, last accessed 31 May 2017. For the NCoB’s work on MRTs, see its Novel
Techniques for the Prevention of Mitochondrial DNA Disorders: an Ethical Review (2012). See further the Hinxton
Group: An International Consortium on Stem Cells, Ethics and Law, ‘Statement on Genome Editing
Technologies and Human Germline Genetic Modification’ (2015); National Academies of Sciences, Engineering,
and Medicine, ‘International Summit on Gene Editing: A Global Discussion’, 1-3 December 2015 (National
Academies Press, 2015) doi: 10.17226/21913, which ‘call[ed] upon the national academies that co-hosted the
summit – the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and U.S. National Academy of Medicine; the Royal Society;
and the Chinese Academy of Sciences – to take the lead in creating an ongoing international forum to discuss
potential clinical uses of gene editing; help inform decisions by national policymakers and others; formulate
recommendations and guidelines; and promote coordination among nations’, 7; and National Academies of
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Human Genome Editing: Science, Ethics, and Governance (National
Academies Press, 2017) doi: 10.17226/24623.
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Section 2 situates the legalisation of MRTs within the UK legal framework. It
also considers the position on germline genetic modification in several key
international statements and conventions and how the revised UK legal
position stands in relation to these.
5 Section 3 explores possible justifications for the view that MRTs do not
constitute germline genetic modification with reference to UK and US policy,
regulatory, legal, scientific and academic materials. The UK classification of
MRTs as something other than germline genetic modification involved
construing the concept more narrowly than might otherwise be the case; two
10 key distinctions were in play in this ‘narrowing’. First, and principally, MRTs
directly concern only the mitochondrial, not the nuclear genome. Second,
MRTs involve replacement (of one whole ‘naturally occurring’ mitochondrial
genome with another), not modification. The supposed normative significance
of these distinctions is that, compared to nuclear genome editing, MRTs: (a)
15 are unlikely to alter in significant ways the identity of the person created; (b) do
not introduce ‘artificial’ elements into the gene pool; and (c) are less likely to
be used for human enhancement. These points played a key role in justifying
the UK legalisation of MRTs. Although the US IOM report reached different
conclusions about germline genetic modification, the same distinctions under-
20 pin its cautiously permissive approach.
Finally, Section 4 critically assesses the argument that modifying the nuclear
genome is more ethically troubling than MRTs because that could, to a greater
extent, affect the ‘identities’ of future people. The section’s main conclusion is
that, while there is no categorical difference (regarding identity) between
25 MRTs and modifying the nuclear genome, a more precautionary approach to
the latter may be justified because of its greater potential for non-therapeutic
use.
Overall, the analysis shows that the distinction between mitochondrial and
nuclear and that between replacement and modification, coupled with the
30 appeal to identity, cannot do the work typically placed on them. Rather, the
permissibility of an intervention in either the mitochondrial or nuclear genome
depends on the context, extent and nature of the intervention in question.
2. MRTs and the UK Legal and International Background
We first consider recent changes to the UK legal position, the nature of the
35 proposed MRTs, and where the UK stands in relation to the international legal
position.
A. UK Legal Background
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (HFE) Act 1990 established a
world-leading legal and regulatory framework for assisted reproduction and
4 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
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embryo research. Over time, however, scientific developments prompted the
courts and Parliament to respond in various ways. For instance, the
development of somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) led to a legal scare
regarding the scope of the HFE Act to govern the use of embryos created by
5 means other than fertilisation, entailing both a legal challenge to the Act10 and
emergency legislation (the Human Reproductive Cloning Act 2001). Against
this background, the 2008 revisions to the HFE Act made explicit that it
applies to all human embryos, no matter how created.11 The Act now excludes
from reproductive use embryos not created by fertilisation, a task previously
10 fulfilled by means of the 2001 Act. It distinguishes ‘permitted’ from other
embryos (and gametes) such that only ‘permitted’ ones may be used in
treatment.12 MRTs have been accommodated within this framework.
The HFE Act was amended in 2008 such that regulations could provide that
eggs or embryos would be ‘permitted . . . even though the egg or embryo has
15 had applied to it in prescribed circumstances a prescribed process designed to
prevent the transmission of serious mitochondrial disease’.13 Two ‘processes’
have been the subject of research, at least one of which may shortly be used in
treatment in the UK - maternal spindle transfer (MST) and pronculear transfer
(PNT):
20 Maternal spindle transfer (MST). The ‘maternal spindle’ is the group of maternal
chromosomes within the egg, which are shaped in a spindle. MST involves removing
the spindle from the mother’s egg before it is fertilised by the father’s sperm. The
spindle is then placed into a donor egg with healthy mitochondria (from which the
donor’s spindle, and therefore her nuclear material, has been removed).
25 Pro-nuclear transfer (PNT). The pro-nucleus is the nucleus of a sperm or an egg cell
during the process of fertilisation after the sperm enters the egg, but before they fuse.
PNT involves removing the pro-nuclei (nuclear material) from a newly fertilised egg
(which is regarded as an embryo under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act
1990) that has unhealthy mitochondria. The pro-nuclei are then transferred into a
30 donated embryo, with healthy mitochondria, that has had its own, original pro-nuclei
removed.14
10 R v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte Bruno Quintavalle (on behalf of Pro-Life Alliance), in which the
House of Lords adopted a ‘purposive’ interpretation of the Act to enable it to encompass embryos created by cell
nuclear transfer (CNR). For discussion, see further Roger Brownsword, ‘Regulating Human Genetics: New
Dilemmas for a New Millennium’ (2004) 12 Med LR 14-39.
11 HFE Act 1990 (as amended) s 1(1)(b).
12 Ibid s 3ZA.
13 Ibid s 3ZA(5).
14 DH, Mitochondrial Donation: A Consultation on Draft Regulations to Permit the Use of New Treatment Techniques
to Prevent the Transmission of a Serious Mitochondrial Disease from Mother to Child (February, 2014) 5, emphases in
original. The former technique was used in the first MRT birth (n 3). J Zhang and others, ‘First Live Birth Using
Human Oocytes Reconstituted by Spindle Nuclear Transfer for Mitochondrial DNA Mutation Causing Leigh
Syndrome’, http://www.fertstert.org/article/S0015-0282(16)62670-5/abstract, last accessed 31 May 2017; Mina
Alikani and others (n 3); John Zhang and others, ‘Live Birth Derived from Oocyte Spindle Transfer to Prevent
Mitochondrial Disease’, (2017) 34(4) Reproductive Biomedicine Online 361-368. The HFEA has now granted
the first UK licence to conduct MRT (PNT). HFEA, ‘Licence Committee – Minutes: Centre 0017 (Newcastle
Germline Genetic Modification and Identity 5
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The subsequently passed Regulations establish that ‘permitted’ eggs or
embryos can have been the subject of particular specified processes (which
detail the relevant methods) in specified circumstances (which concern the risk
of disease).15 The Regulations also provide that there must have been ‘no
5 alterations in the nuclear or mitochondrial DNA’ either of an egg following
MST, or of an embryo following PNT.16
We next consider how these techniques should be viewed with reference to
the concept of ‘germline genetic modification’, looking first at key international
statements and conventions.
10
B. International Statements and Conventions
The UK Government’s position that PNT and MST are not forms of ‘germline
genetic modification’ is influenced by long-standing international opposition to
such modification (especially of human beings).17 Consider Sir Edward Leigh’s
contribution to the House of Commons debate in which he asked whether ‘we
15 really want to become a rogue state in terms of bioethics?’.18 It is therefore
instructive to see how the UK’s legalisation of MRTs fits into this international
context.
By way of introduction, we note three points. First, international statements
and conventions use a range of terms relevant to the discussion of germline
20 genetic modification and these require interpretation. Second, the implications
for the permissibility of particular practices are sometimes unclear. Third, at
least in one early statement, there are indications of factors which might
support the permissibility of germline modifications in particular circum-
stances, such as where the aim is to treat or eradicate disease.
25 This early statement is the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe’s 1982 recommendation on Genetic Engineering. Paragraph 4(a) boldly
asserts that ‘the rights to life and to human dignity protected by Articles 2 and
3 of the European Convention on Human Rights [ECHR] imply the right to
inherit a genetic pattern which has not been artificially changed’.19 Whether, or in
30 what way, MRTs involve such changes is, as discussed below, an important
Fertility at Life), Variation of Licensed Activities to include Mitochondria Pronuclear Transfer (PNT)’, 9 March
2017.
15 The Regulations (n 1) Part 2, paras 3, 4 and 5 regarding eggs, and 6, 7 and 8 regarding embryos. The
circumstances concern the ‘particular risk’ of an egg or embryo having ‘mitochondrial abnormalities caused by
mitochondrial DNA’, coupled with a ‘significant risk that a person with those abnormalities will have or develop
serious mitochondrial disease’.
16 Ibid Part 2, paras 3(c) and 6(c) respectively.
17 On aspects of the history of the debate, including the main types of arguments that have been used in
opposition, see eg Burke K Zimmerman, ‘Human Germ-Line Therapy: The Case for its Development and Use’
(1991) 16 J Med Philos 593-612, 604ff, who refers to ‘germ-line intervention’ being a ‘loaded issue’ in 1991,
604. See also Andrea L Bonnickson, ‘The Politics of Germline Therapy’ (1998) 19 Nature Genetics 10-11.
18 HC Deb 1 September 2014, col 112.
19 Rec 934 (1982) (emphasis added).
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issue. For now, we note that this statement relies on a considerable degree of
interpretation of those articles, respectively the right to life and the right (in
part) not to be subjected to ‘inhuman or degrading treatment’.20 Paragraph
4(b) adds that ‘this right should be made explicit in the context of the
5 European Convention on Human Rights’. However, as of 2017 – 35 years later
– the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has not yet done so. In any
event, paragraph 4(c) shifts the tone, holding:
[T]he explicit recognition of . . . [the right to inherit a genetic pattern which has not
been artificially changed] must not impede development of the therapeutic applications
10 of genetic engineering (gene therapy), which holds great promise for the treatment and
eradication of certain diseases which are genetically transmitted.21
This strikes a more permissive note regarding ‘gene therapy’ although the
meaning of that expression is unclear. It seems unlikely that it refers only to
‘somatic’ gene therapy (therapy relating to a cell in the human body that is not
15 a germ cell)22 as this cannot eradicate genetically inherited disease.
Furthermore, the notion of ‘eradication’, together with the phrase ‘genetically
transmitted’ and paragraph 4(c)’s implicit reference back to paragraph 4(a)’s
statement regarding inheritance, suggests a potentially permissive (though
guarded) approach towards germline modification.
20 In this light, MRTs may be consistent with paragraph 4(c) if they treat an
individual or eradicate disease, a framing prevalent in the UK policy debate.23
Since under both the amended and original HFE Act, the HFEA can only
issue licences for research, treatment, or storage,24 when MRTs move out of
the research setting, they will necessarily be classed as ‘treatment’ for
25 regulatory purposes. Whether however MRTs should be viewed as treatment
in a wider sense (that is, for purposes other than regulatory classification) is a
more complex and controversial question. PNT may be seen as ‘treatment’,
because it occurs after the development of the embryonic pronuclei, and thus is
something that happens to a determinate individual.25 By contrast, MST may
20 Indeed, two authors wryly observed ‘[w]e fail to see the ‘‘implication’’’. R Munson and LH Davies, ‘Germ-
Line Gene Therapy and the Medical Imperative’ (1992) 2(2) Kennedy Inst Ethics J 137-158, 142. Article 2(1) of
the ECHR, first sentence, states: ‘Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law.’ Article 3 states: ‘No one shall
be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’
21 Rec 934 (n 19), emphases added.
22 IOM (n 6) 28.
23 For example, the HFEA (n 2) included multiple references to MRTs as ‘treatment’, eg paras 1.9, 1.18,
1.19, 2.3, 2.12. Similarly, the DH (n 14), 5, introduced MRTs as ‘newly developed treatment techniques to
prevent the transfer of a serious mitochondrial disease from a mother to her child’, and made further reference to
MRTs as such. It also noted that MRTs ‘would be a form of . . . germ line gene therapy as recognised by reports
produced by the HFEA and . . . [NCoB]’, para 1.27 (emphasis added).
24 HFE Act 1990 (as amended) s 11.
25 Anthony Wrigley, Stephen Wilkinson and John B Appleby, ‘Mitochondrial Replacement: Ethics and
Identity’ (2015) 29 Bioethics 631-638, 638.
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be viewed as selective reproduction, because mitochondrial replacement occurs
before fertilisation.26 These issues are discussed in Section 4.
It is also worth noting here that whether an intervention is a ‘treatment’ in a
wider sense, or in an ethical or philosophical sense, may be (at most) only very
5 indirectly related to its regulatory status. For example, in the context of avoiding
the birth of a child with a serious genetic condition, treatment licenses have
previously been granted for techniques which do not treat the future child.
Under the original Act (as a matter of statutory interpretation)27 and now the
amended Act, treatment licences have been granted for preimplantation genetic
10 diagnosis (PGD), a form of selection described as ‘testing embryos’ and
situated as occurring ‘in the course of providing treatment services’,28
themselves defined in the Act as ‘medical, surgical or obstetric services
provided to the public or a section of the public for the purpose of assisting
women to carry children’.29 At the same time, with their various references to
15 ‘therapy’, the consultation and policy materials leading to the passage of the
MRT Regulations cast MRTs as ‘treatment’ of a future person.30 In relation to
MRTs, there is thus some fluidity in the interpretation of ‘treatment’ in the UK
policy and regulatory context, which likely has a normative purpose in the
debate.
20 In contrast to the UK’s characterisation of MRTs as ‘treatment’ of a future
person, the US IOM report emphasizes that MRTs do not treat and that the
concept of ‘treatment’ can only be understood in this context as treatment of
the prospective parents.31 The IOM report also stresses that MRTs do not
prevent disease in existing people,32 which is consistent with the UK policy
25 position.
Regardless of whether MRTs treat disease, they may nonetheless contribute
to the eradication of disease, and so could be compatible with the Council of
Europe’s 1982 Recommendation on that basis. In this light, even if Articles 2
and 3 of the ECHR could reasonably be interpreted, as the Council
30 recommended, to ‘imply the right to inherit a genetic pattern which has not
been artificially changed’ (which is doubtful), it is questionable whether this
could (or should) include the right to inherit disease. In any event, the
26 Ibid. Some authors (such as Liao and Rulli) go further and suggest both PNT and MST are selection,
rather than therapy. S Matthew Liao, ‘Do Mitochondrial Replacement Techniques Affect Qualitative or
Numerical Identity?’ (2017) Bioethics 20-26; Tina Rulli, ‘What Is the Value of Three-Parent IVF?’ (2016) 46
Hastings Cent Rep 38-47.
27 Regina (Quintavalle) v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Secretary of State for Health intervening)
[2005] 2 AC 561, in which the House of Lords held that the HFEA could license HLA-typing by PGD to enable
a child to be born who would be a tissue match for a sibling with beta thalassaemia major.
28 HFE Act 1990 (as amended), Sched 2, para 1(1)(b).
29 Ibid s 2(1) (emphasis added).
30 Above (n 23).
31 IOM (n 6) 6. Of course, this accords with the legal sense of the term ‘treatment services’ in the UK, and
the situation of MRTs within these. This finding is a central plank of the report’s ethical analysis, which identifies
the welfare of the future child, and minimising risk to that child, as the ‘primary value’. Ibid 116.
32 Ibid 87.
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meanings and significance of ‘genetic’ and of ‘artificially changed’ are
contested, as Section 3 (below) shows.
The vagueness of the 1982 Recommendation’s references to ‘respect for
human rights’ was criticized, the same year, in a guardedly permissive US
5 President’s Commission Report, Splicing Life,33 which warned of the ‘risk . . . of
depriving humanity of the great benefits genetic engineering may bring’.34 Yet,
since the early 1980s, various developments have increased concern about
germline genetic modification. These include the publication of the majority of
the human genome in 2001,35 as well as the development of SCNT, which
10 triggered alarm and the widespread prohibition of human reproductive
cloning.36
Perhaps it is not surprising therefore that a 2003 report of the International
Bioethics Committee (IBC) of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) found legislation in nine countries,
15 including the UK, apparently prohibiting germline modification (using various
expressions).37 The previous year a World Health Organisation (WHO)
Bulletin piece stated that ‘most [relevant] ethical and legal regulations that
cover this issue strongly discourage or frankly prohibit [germline interven-
tions]’.38 The international statements and conventions in question are very
20 significant, but require interpretation with reference to MRTs.
First, the 1997 UNESCO Universal Declaration on the Human Genome
and Human Rights holds, in Article 1, that ‘[t]he human genome underlies the
fundamental unity of all members of the human family, as well as the
recognition of their inherent dignity and diversity. In a symbolic sense, it is the
25 heritage of humanity’.39 Article 5(a) states (in part) that ‘[r]esearch, treatment
or diagnosis affecting an individual’s genome shall be undertaken only after
33 President’s Commission, Splicing Life: A Report on the Social and Ethical Issues of Genetic Engineering with
Human Beings (President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, 1982) 48.
34 Ibid 78.
35 National Human Genome Research Institute, International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium Publishes
Sequence and Analysis of the Human Genome (12 February 2001).
36 In a 2002 report the President’s Council on Bioethics stated that ‘[t]he notion of cloning raises issues about
identity and individuality’. President’s Council, Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Enquiry (PCBE,
2002). For further discussion on individuality and uniqueness, see Dan Brock, ‘Human Cloning and Our Sense
of Self ’ (2002) Science 314-316. These developments had reverberations even in EctHR jurisprudence not
obviously in point. Eg in Vo v France, 53924/00 [2004] 2 FCR 577, concerning the applicability of Article 2 (the
right to life) to the fetus, the dissenting judges expressed concerns regarding ‘genetic engineering’ (Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Ress, para 5), ‘genetic manipulation and the risk that scientific results will be used for a
purpose that undermines the dignity and identity of the human being’ (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Mularoni,
joined by Judge Stra´zˇnicka´ (no paragraph numbers).
37 UNESCO, Report of the IBC on Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and Germline Intervention (2003), Annex 2;
the UK reference therein is to the HFE Act 1990 Sched 2, para 3(4), discussed below. See further BioPolicyWiki,
‘Inheritable Genetic Modification’ (2014) available at http://biopolicywiki.org/index.php?title=Inheritable_
genetic_modification, last accessed 31 May 2017.
38 Robert Andorno, ‘Biomedicine and International Human Rights Law: in Search of a Global Consensus’,
(2002) 80(12) Bull World Health Organ 959-963, 961. Andorno notes that, at the time of writing, he is a
Member of the UNESCO International Bioethics Committee.
39 The NCoB has suggested that an important question in relation to genome editing is who the ‘public’ is in
‘public interest’ and whether, for instance, ‘the content of . . . [the] interest [in genome editing can] . . . be
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rigorous and prior assessment of the potential risks and benefits’, as well as
reference to relevant national laws.40 Whether the latter emphasized passage
refers only to somatic or also to germline interventions is not clear. Article 5(b)
stresses the importance, ‘[i]n all cases’ of ‘the prior, free and informed consent
5 of the person’, observing that if this is not possible, ‘consent or authorization’
should be guided by ‘best interests’, with due regard to relevant national laws.
This suggests a focus on somatic interventions. Indeed, looking more broadly
at the Convention, Article 11 reads: ‘Practices which are contrary to human
dignity, such as reproductive cloning of human beings, shall not be permitted’.
10 More particularly, Article 24 refers to the IBC (of UNESCO) making
recommendations regarding ‘the identification of practices that could be
contrary to human dignity, such as germ-line interventions’.41 This suggests
that Article 5 is best interpreted as referring only to somatic interventions. It
certainly implies that, under the Convention, techniques such as MRTs need
15 to be considered with reference to the concept of dignity. Taking on this
challenge, the UK Government confidently stated:
In bringing forward regulations to enable mitochondrial donation we have been
mindful of the UK’s obligations under international law. We do not consider that
permitting mitochondrial donation, aimed at preventing serious hereditary conditions,
20 would be contrary to human dignity as envisaged by Article 24 of the UNESCO
declaration.42
The Government’s stress on the preventative purpose of MRTs highlights
their positive aims and comparatively limited scope for effecting genetic
change. It also suggests that treating disease does not threaten dignity, at least
25 where issues of consent or best interests (for those who lack capacity) are
addressed.43 However, after the change to the UK legal position to accom-
modate MRTs, and following developments relating to genome editing in the
latter half of 2015, the IBC called for ‘a moratorium on genome editing of the
human germline’, at least while safety concerns prevail; further, with reference
30 to the development of MRTs, it noted the 2012 recommendation of the
Nuffield Council on Bioethics (NCoB) that MRTs should be ‘adequately
proven to be acceptably safe and effective as treatments’ before entering clinical
determined independently for a given political community or . . . [whether] it [is] coextensive with the scope of
universal human rights’. NCoB (2016) (n 9) para 4.42.
40 Emphases added.
41 Emphases added.
42 DH (n 14) para 1.29 (emphasis added). Contextualising the UNESCO declaration, the UK Government
elsewhere observed that ‘UNESCO declarations are statements of principles or a common standard of
achievement, which are not signed or ratified and are not legally binding.’ DH (n 1) 16.
43 In the UK, see the HFEA’s advice regarding long-term studies of children born following the use of MRTs,
HFEA (n 2) para 6.33; in the US, see the IOM (n 6) 12, Rec 3. On the empowering role of the notion of dignity
in human rights analyses, as opposed to its constraining role for ‘dignitarians’, see Roger Brownsword,
‘Regulating Human Enhancement: Things Can Only Get Better?’ (2009) 1(1) Law, Innovation and Technology
125-152, 129.
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practice, but suggested that ‘even’ scientists disagree on the fulfilment of this
standard and that ‘the debate remains open on the ethical acceptability of
[MRTs]’.44 As was the UK Government, however, the IOM was doubtful that
the UNESCO declaration should stand in the way of MRTs.45
5 Second, the Council of Europe’s 1997 Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine (the Oviedo Convention) currently has 35 Member State
signatories and 29 ratifications, and is described by the Council of Europe as
a ‘framework Convention aiming at protecting dignity and identity of all
human beings’.46 This is legally binding although the UK is not a signatory.
10 Article 13, ‘Interventions on the human genome’, states that ‘an intervention
seeking to modify the human genome may only be undertaken for preventive,
diagnostic or therapeutic purposes and only if its aim is not to introduce any
modification in the genome of any descendants’.47 The addition of the latter
emphasized phrase signifies that germline modification of the ‘human genome’
15 is impermissible. That said, several questions remain. For example, what does
‘aim’ mean?48 In the UK policy debate, it was noted that the aim would be to
prevent a person being born with mitochondrial disease, but also that future
generations would benefit (by not carrying mitochondrial disease).49 Would the
first point be caught by this article? What about the second, which could either
20 be viewed as a secondary aim, or a foreseen effect? The terms ‘modification’
and ‘genome’ also require interpretation. Notwithstanding these uncertainties,
in late 2015, the Council of Europe’s Committee on Bioethics was ‘convinced
that the . . . Convention provides principles that could be used as reference for
the debate called for at international level on the fundamental questions raised
25 by . . . recent technological developments’ such as CRISPR/Cas-9 and signalled
its intention to use the principles to do so itself.50
Compared with the Council of Europe’s 1982 Recommendation, the 1997
UNESCO declaration and the 1997 Oviedo Convention take more overtly
negative stances towards germline genetic intervention, due to concerns about
44 UNESCO, IBC, ‘Report of the IBC on Updating its Reflection on the Human Genome and Human
Rights’ 2 October 2015, SHS/YES/IBC-22/15/2 REV.2, para 118, emphasis in original. The specific reference to
CRISPR/Cas-9 (in para. 102) refers to developments in China announced in April 2015. The references to the
NCoB are to its 2012 report (n 9).
45 IOM (n 6) 93.
46 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the
Application of Biology and Medicine, ETS No 164, Oviedo, 4 April 1997. The description of the Convention by
the Council is at: http://www.coe.int/en/web/bioethics/oviedo-convention, last accessed 31 May 2017.
47 Emphases added.
48 The idea of intentional interferences is discussed in John EJ Rasko, Gabrielle M O’Sullivan and Rachel A
Ankeny, ‘Is Inheritable Genetic Modification the New Dividing Line?’ in John EJ Rasko, Gabrielle M O’Sullivan
and Rachel A Ankeny (eds), The Ethics of Inheritable Genetic Modification (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 1-
15, 5.
49 See eg North East England Stem Cell Institute (NEESCI), ‘Briefing Paper on the Need to Protect the
Future Possibility of Treating Mitochondrial Disease and Other Conditions by a Procedure that Involves
Mitochondrial Transplantation’ (May, 2008) 4.
50 Council of Europe (n 9) 13, 2.
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human dignity and identity.51 Indeed, the 2002 WHO Bulletin piece suggested
that ‘what is at stake in [prohibiting] . . . human genetic engineering . . . is
nothing less than the preservation of the identity of the human species’.52
Furthermore, as can be seen from the 2015 statements of the UNESCO IBC
5 and the Council of Europe’s Committee on Bioethics, both the UNESCO
declaration and the Oviedo Convention are set to play a role in debate
prompted by recent developments in nuclear genome editing. So although
MRTs ‘are not germ-line interventions in the sense that originally animated
ethical debate’,53 in the light of the international context, it is understandable
10 that the UK Government has been at pains to maintain that they are not
‘germline genetic modification’.
3. ‘Germline Modification’ and ‘Genetic Modification’: The Key
Distinctions in Play
This section explores both interpretative and bioethical justifications for the
15 UK Government position that MRTs are not ‘germline genetic modification’.
It considers how ‘germline modification’ and ‘genetic modification’ have been
defined and used in the UK and US debates and shows that the UK
Government’s claim that MRTs are not ‘germline genetic modification’ relies
on two distinctions: principally between the mitochondrial and nuclear
20 genomes, and also between ‘replacement’ and ‘modification’. Although the
US IOM report concludes that MRTs are germline genetic modification,
reliance on these distinctions is also central to its approach. Underlying them is
a fundamental concern with not controlling or altering ‘identity’, especially by
‘artificial’ means.
25
A. The Mitochondrial versus the Nuclear Genome: the Major Theme
A key concern in the UK House of Commons debate was whether to permit
MRTs would be to permit germline ‘genetic modification’. When questioned,
the Under-Secretary of State for Health, Jane Ellison, maintained both that
there is no internationally accepted definition of ‘genetic modification’ and that
30 mitochondrial replacement is not an instance of it,54 in line with the
Government’s Response to the Consultation on the Draft Regulations in 2014:
51 For criticism see eg Annelien L Bredenoord, Rieke van der Graaf and Johannes J M van Delden, ‘Towards
a ‘‘Post-human Dignity Area’’ in Evaluating Emergent Enhancement Technologies’ (2010) 10(7) AJOB 55-57,
56.
52 Andorno (n 38) 960.
53 John A Robertson, ‘Oocyte Cytoplasm Transfers and the Ethics of Germ-Line Intervention’ (1998) 26 J
Law Med Ethics 211-220, 216.
54 HC Deb 3 February 2015, col 162. Her answer is somewhat unclear: ‘It has to be said that there is no
universally agreed definition of genetic modification, but for the purposes of these regulations, we have used a
working definition and it involves not altering the nuclear DNA.’
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There is no universally agreed definition of ‘genetic modification’ in humans. . . . The
working definition that we have adopted is that genetic modification involves the germ-
line modification of nuclear DNA (in the chromosomes) that can be passed on to future
generations.55
5 Whether MRTs are germline genetic modification was subsequently a key point
in evidence taken by the House of Commons Science and Technology
Committee (HCSTC). Professor Sally Davies, Chief Medical Officer (CMO),
explained the rationale for the Government’s approach:
Germline is anything that is done to DNA that goes through the generations, and
10 mitochondria go from woman to child through the generations. This is clearly a
germline modification because it passes through, but we needed to make the distinction
between nuclear DNA, which makes us who we are and how we are – our personalities,
heights, weights and whether or not we get baldness – and the 37 genes in the
mitochondria which are about energy for the cell, and which we describe as the power
15 pack. That was why we adopted that working definition.56
While the CMO holds that MRTs are a ‘germline modification’, she moves
swiftly to contrast the mitochondrial and nuclear genomes. The reference to
‘who we are and how we are’ implies that the nuclear genome is determinative
of ‘identity’ and thus highly influential and significant. By contrast, the role of
20 mitochondria is ‘only’ energy production. Likewise, in its consultation on the
draft regulations, the DH notes that ‘it is genes in our nuclear DNA, together
with environmental factors, rather than mitochondrial DNA, that shape our
personal characteristics and traits.’57 In this light, ‘[m]ost importantly’, the DH
emphasizes, ‘mitochondrial donation techniques do not alter personal characteristics
25 and traits’.58
So although described by the UK Government as ‘germline modification’,
MRTs are distinguished from ‘germline genetic modification’ on the basis that
the nuclear, rather than the mitochondrial genome, determines ‘personal
characteristics and traits’. Thus, on the Government’s view, mitochondrial
30 replacement is not ‘germline genetic modification’ because it does not alter
these aspects of a person’s identity. By implication, it is therefore far less
significant than nuclear intervention. We consider to what extent this is
justifiable in Section 4.
Very significantly, this association of the nuclear genome with ‘identity’
35 appears to have been influenced by the reasoning underlying the HFEA
decision to license research into PNT at the Newcastle Fertility Centre at
55 DH (n 1) 15 (emphases added). The Government’s approach had been the subject of some criticism in July
2014, including from scientists such as Lord Winston and Dr Ted Morrow. See http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/science/exclusive-scientists-accuse-government-of-dishonesty-over-gm-babies-in-its-regulation-of-new-ivf-
technique-9631807.html, last accessed 31 May 2017.
56 House of Commons Science and Technology Committee (HCSTC), Oral Evidence: Mitochondrial Donation,
HC 730, 22 October 2014, 25 (emphases added).
57 DH (n 14) para 1.5 (emphases added). See eg NEESCI (n 49) 4.
58 Ibid para 1.27 (emphases added).
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Life.59 Following an initial rejection, the application went to an HFEA Appeal
Committee, which considered two key issues. First, was the proposed research
prohibited by section 3(3)(d) of the original 1990 Act? This reads: ‘(3) A
licence cannot authorise – . . . (d) replacing a nucleus of a cell of an embryo
5 with a nucleus taken from a cell of any person, embryo or subsequent
development of an embryo’? In response, the Committee noted that ‘the
proposed research would involve the removal of the pronuclei at the one cell
(zygote) stage’ and it ‘accepted the view that . . . ‘‘the zygote . . . at no stage
contains a single nucleus . . .’’’.60 Second, did Schedule 2, paragraph 3(4) of the
10 original HFE Act prohibit the research? That paragraph reads: ‘A licence under
this paragraph cannot authorise altering the genetic structure of any cell while it
forms part of an embryo.’61 Critically, if the research were deemed to involve
such alteration, it could not be licenced.
The Committee observed that ‘genetic structure’ was ‘ambiguous’ and
15 therefore used various ‘interpretative criteria’.62 First, it ‘accepted the view of
the scientific community . . . that when pressed to give meaning to the phrase, it
considered ‘‘genetic structure’’ to have a relatively narrow definition . . . [which]
would centre on the expression of nuclear genes that result in heritable
characteristics’.63 Second, it decided that ‘genetic structure’ should be under-
20 stood with reference to a lay person’s understanding of ‘genetic’, so that
alteration thereto ‘would involve alteration to the genes or the genome and the
resulting heritable characteristics’.64 Third, the Committee reasoned that ‘what
might be considered a narrow definition . . . is aligned with the purposive intent
of . . . the Act’,65 observing (with reference to the White Paper), that
25 Parliament had been concerned ‘to restrict techniques which would allow the
artificial creation of human beings with certain pre-determined characteristics
through modification of an early embryo’s genetic structure’; it also stressed that
it thought that the ‘overall’ concern of Parliament was to prohibit ‘selecting
characteristics, or ensuring a predisposition as to certain characteristics’.66
30 The Committee’s reasoning relies on a distinction between the nuclear and
mitochondrial genomes, supported by scientific and lay opinion. It also
highlights a Parliamentary concern with ‘artificial creation’ through ‘modifica-
tion’ aimed at selecting or shaping specific characteristics. The US IOM report
likewise emphasizes the nuclear/mitochondrial distinction and appeals to the
35 ‘public understanding’ of ‘genetic’, observing that ‘[w]hile mtDNA plays a
central role in genetic ancestry, traits that are carried in nDNA are those that
59 HFEA, ‘Mitochondrial DNA Disorders – Is There a Way to Prevent Transmission? Summary of How the
HFEA Made its Decision to Licence this Project of Research’ (2005) RO153.
60 Ibid para 13.
61 HFE Act 1990, Sched 2, para 3(4), emphasis added.
62 HFEA (n 59) para 14.
63 Ibid para 16 (emphases added).
64 Ibid para 17 (emphases added).
65 Ibid para 17.
66 Ibid para 18 (emphases added).
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in the public understanding constitute the core of genetic relatedness in terms
of physical and behavioral characteristics as well as most forms of disease’.67
A second aspect of the HFEA Appeal Committee’s reasoning focused, not
on the ‘target’ of alteration, but on the ‘manner’ of it. The Committee
5 reasoned that:
[R]emoving the pronuclei from the zygote does not cause the genetic structure to be
altered, nor does the depositing of the pronuclei in the cytoplasm of an enucleated
egg . . . [and that] this does not change the genetic structure of the new cell because
the nuclear material overrides any DNA in the mitochondrial DNA.68
10 It also considered the meaning of the ‘extended’ phrase ‘altering the genetic
structure of any cell while it forms part of an embryo’, reasoning that, while
PNT would result in a change to the ‘genetic constitution or composition’ of an
embryo, it would not result in any change to its ‘genetic structure’, referring to
its earlier discussion of the latter term.69
15 Subsequently, the question of the way in which MRTs involve changes to
embryos or eggs became the second, and minor, theme in the legal and policy
debate, to which we now turn.
B. ‘Replacement’ versus ‘Modification’: the Minor Theme
In the run-up to the passage of the 2015 Regulations, MRTs were justified in
20 part by reference to the nature of the methods involved, methods distanced from
genetic modification on the grounds that instead they amount to replacement or
donation.
This distinction was a focus in various pieces of evidence to the HCSTC in
late 2014. For instance, Professor Robin Lovell-Badge, a member of the
25 HFEA’s Review Panel, stated ‘you could call [MRTs] germline modification –
the HFEA used ‘‘germline therapy modification’’’.70 However, he quickly
clarified what sort of ‘modification’ he meant, as follows:
You are not changing specific DNA sequences, which is generally how I as an
experimental biologist would talk about genetic manipulation or modification. You
30 are swapping an intact mitochondrial DNA genome which . . . happens anyway through
natural reproduction. It is not as if you are engineering a specific piece of sequence . . . I
do not see it as a form of genetic modification.71
This passage stresses replacement of a whole genome, rather than the
modification of parts of one, and invokes the idea that this occurs in nature
67 IOM (n 6) 107 (emphases added).
68 HFEA (n 59) para 20.
69 HFEA (n 59) para 22 (emphases in original).
70 HCSTC (n 56) 13 (emphases added).
71 Ibid (emphases added).
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anyway. Interjecting, Dr Ted Morrow asked ‘[i]f it is germline modification,
how can it not be genetic?’.72 Professor Lovell-Badge’s response was that ‘[i]t
is. We have not hidden from the fact that it is germline modification; we have
always said that’.73 By itself, this is not fully clear and the only reference to
5 ‘germline modification’ in the HFEA Review Panel’s various reports occurs in
its third report, in a footnote reference to ‘genome editing’ techniques which, it
states, ‘could not be applied to oocytes or early embryos under the HFE Act,
because they would constitute germline modification that would require a change
in primary legislation’.74 So, to make sense of Professor Lovell-Badge’s
10 evidence we may need to interpret him as referring to MRTs as ‘germline
modification’ in the same way as the CMO (above), namely ‘simply’ in the
sense that the intervention ‘passes through’. The point that specific DNA
sequences are not changed by mitochondrial replacement was reiterated by
Professor Peter Braude, also a member of the HFEA Review Panel, who
15 stressed: ‘You are not modifying the actual genome of the mother and father; you
are simply moving it into another bag.’75
Differences between replacement and alteration were stressed elsewhere, for
instance by the Wellcome Trust.76 Similarly, the Parliamentary Office of
Science and Technology (POST) stated that ‘the changes . . . involve swapping
20 one person’s mtDNA for another’s. This is in contrast to techniques for
modifying nDNA which involve snipping gene sequences from one cell and
splicing them into another’.77 This was with reference to the idea that allowing
mitochondrial replacement ‘may have little effect on the consensus not to alter
germ line nDNA’.78 Likewise, an NCoB Briefing Paper noted that with MRTs
25 ‘[n]either the nuclear envelope nor mitochondrial membranes need be
disturbed . . . [i]n contrast, nDNA modification would, at least, require
penetration into the nucleus and probably DNA recombination . . .’.79
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid (emphasis added).
74 HFEA Review Panel (n 5) 37, n 41 (emphasis added).
75 HCSTC (n 56) 14 (emphases added).
76 The Wellcome Trust emphasized that mitochondrial replacement ‘allows for unaltered nuclear DNA to be
transferred to an egg or embryo that has unaltered healthy mitochondria . . .. These techniques therefore only
replace, rather than alter, a small number of unhealthy genes in the ‘‘battery pack’’ of the cells with healthy ones.’
Wellcome Trust Written Evidence (MIT0008), HCSTC (n 56) para 4 (emphases added),
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/science-and-technology-
committee/mitochondrial-donation/written/13719.html, last accessed 31 May 2017.
77 POST, ‘Preventing Mitochondrial Disease’ (2013) 431 (March) Postnote 4 (emphases added).
78 Ibid, citing the NCoB report’s reference to a ‘distinct material boundary’ between the nuclear and
mitochondrial genomes: ‘The fact that there is a distinct material boundary between mitochondrial and nuclear
genes allows regulators to establish an equally clear legal distinction between modifications to the different
genomes, thereby forming a practical barrier to the threat of ‘‘slippery slope’’ arguments.’ NCoB 2012 (n 9) para
4.65. In turn, the NCoB had referred to a number of relevant statements, including the NEESCI (n 49), 4,
which states: ‘Germline gene therapy is a term used for modifying genes in the nuclear genome at the beginning
of development with the intention of changing the organism in a specific way and for potentially transmitting this change
to subsequent progeny . . .. Replacing diseased mitochondria with healthy ones is an inherently less complicated
procedure. No genome is being modified. Whole mitochondria are being replaced.’ (Emphases added.)
79 Mark S Frankel and Brent T Hagen, ‘Germline Therapies’ (NCoB, 2011) para 13.
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These statements all distinguish, in various ways, modifying or altering a
genome (the nuclear one) from replacing one entire ‘unhealthy’ genome (the
mitochondrial one) with another ‘healthy’ one. The use of terms such as
‘transferring’, ‘swapping’, ‘moving’ or ‘replacing’ a whole genome, as opposed
5 to ‘modifying’ or ‘altering’ parts of one, is striking. It is also noteworthy given
that, in the amended HFE Act, the legality of PNT in particular has been
established as an exception to the prohibition in Schedule 2, paragraph 1(4),
which states (in part) that ‘[a] licence under this paragraph cannot authorise
altering the nuclear or mitochondrial DNA of a cell while it forms part of an
10 embryo, except for the purpose of creating something that will by virtue of
regulations under section 3ZA(5) be a permitted embryo’.80 This is a revision
of the provision in the original Act prohibiting the alteration of the ‘genetic
structure of any cell while it forms part of an embryo’.81 Somewhat
confusingly, though understandably given the revised section’s wording, the
15 DH Explanatory Notes refer to the ‘regulation-making power’ as ‘enabl[ing]
eggs and/or embryos with altered mitochondrial DNA to be classified as
‘permitted’ eggs or embryos . . .’.82 A similar ambiguity can be found in a
House of Commons Library ‘Standard Note’ which states that ‘[t]hese
techniques . . . propose a change to an embryo’s DNA prior to implantation’,
20 and that ‘[a]s such, they have been the subject of some opposition and
controversy.’83 Expressed this way, and in the light of the international
background discussed earlier, such controversy is perhaps unsurprising.
Given what is actually involved in MRTs, the only way to understand the
Act, the Explanatory Notes and the House of Commons Library statement is
25 to interpret the Act as referring to, and permitting as an exception, ‘alteration’
of the genetic composition of the egg or embryo, rather than alteration of
mitochondrial DNA per se. This would be consistent with the HFEA Appeal
Committee’s reasoning: that mitochondrial replacement does involve ‘inter-
ventions’ in eggs or embryos (through a ‘replacement’ process), ones that
30 change their genetic ‘composition’, but no alteration to or modification of the
mitochondrial DNA itself. The emphasis on this last point seems motivated by a
wish to distance MRTs from modification of the nuclear genome, no doubt in
the light of the history of the HFE Act and the international background.
Thus, the contrast between the genomes (mitochondrial versus nuclear) is
35 accompanied by an emphasis on the nature of the intervention: that is, on the
substitution of whole ‘natural’ elements, rather than ‘engineered’ changes, seen
as ‘artificial’.
80 HFE Act 1990 (as amended), s 3ZA(5), emphases added.
81 HFE Act 1990, Sched 2, para 3(4), discussed in text following n 61.
82 HFE Act 2008, Explanatory Notes (2008) para 162, (emphases added).
83 House of Commons Library, ‘Mitochondrial Donation’, Standard Note: SN/SC/6833, 30, para 8 (emphasis
added); 16, para 5.1.
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To some degree, the same move is made by the US IOM, which contrasts
‘[t]he replacement of whole, intact, and naturally occurring mitochondrial genomes’
with ‘any approach for modifying nDNA, which would likely involve editing
rather than en bloc replacement of chromosomes’.84 The Committee argues that
5 there is ‘a qualitatively different form of heritable genetic change’85 between
the two kinds of intervention, with the connection between the nature of the
respective genomes and the relevant methods of intervention in relation to
either again being very apparent. The IOM report also observes that ‘[w]hile
there is no direct modification or editing of the mtDNA sequence itself, the novel
10 combination of mtDNA from one woman and nDNA from another would not
occur in unassisted sexual reproduction or in other ARTs.’86
From here on, however, the UK and US part company. Thus, working with
the terms of reference and definitions established by the FDA, the report views
‘genetic modification’ as ‘changes to the genetic material within a cell’.87 On
15 this basis, the Committee ‘considers MRT to be ‘‘genetic modification’’ of the
oocyte or zygote.’88 Significantly then, MRTs do constitute ‘genetic modifica-
tion’, not because they involve genome editing, but because they entail a ‘novel
combination’ of genetic material. Moreover, noting that ‘germline modifica-
tion’ is defined by the FDA as ‘human inheritable genetic modification’, the
20 Committee also finds that:
MRT results in the genetic modification of germ cells, but . . . it constitutes
heritable genetic modification (germline modification) only if used to produce female
offspring because mtDNA is solely maternally inherited, and therefore MRT to
produce male offspring would not constitute heritable genetic modification (germline
25 modification).89
Hence, in a significant departure from the UK Government and the HFEA
Appeal Committee, the IOM finds that MRTs would amount to germline
genetic modification if female offspring were born.
Of course, while the IOM had to work within the framework established
30 by the FDA, this did not include a legislative background that might bar
certain kinds of intervention. By contrast, if the UK HFEA Appeal Committee
had not held, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that MRTs do not involve
‘genetic modification’ (specifically, ‘alteration’), research into PNT could
not have been licensed without a change to the original HFE Act. Thus,
35 defining (by implication) ‘germline genetic modification’ to exclude interven-
tions relating only to the mitochondrial genome was essential for research to
progress at that time. This move undoubtedly influenced the terms of the UK
84 IOM (n 6) 107 (emphases added).
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid 88 (emphases added).
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid (emphasis added).
89 Ibid 6 (emphases added); see further 88-89.
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debate. Significantly however, despite differing from the UK Government
position that MRTs are not germline genetic modification, the IOM report is
nonetheless consistent with the Government’s emphasis on the mitochondrial/
nuclear distinction (together with distinctions between the potential scope and
5 purpose of interventions in either case), and on that between ‘wholesale
replacement’ and ‘modification’.
Seen as centrally involving replacement, MRTs are aligned with genetic
selection – long established in prenatal diagnosis (PND) and PGD. They are
thereby distanced from genetic modification and nuclear genome ‘editing’. In
10 this way, and given the aim of disease prevention, children born through MRTs
are positioned far from the hypothetical one discussed in the President’s
Council on Bioethics Report, Reproduction and Responsibility, in 2004, ‘who . . .
designed to certain specifications might be viewed as more of an artefact – or
more answerable to the will of his or her parents – than a child who is merely
15 selected for his or her existing characteristics’.90
In the next section, we examine the (supposed) normative significance of the
distinctions between the mitochondrial and the nuclear, and between replacement/
selection and modification.
4. Identity
20 This section focuses on what was earlier shown to be central to the legal and
policy debate: the claim that nuclear genetic modification is more ethically
problematic than mitochondrial replacement because it is more likely signifi-
cantly to affect the resultant child’s identity.
A. Three Senses of ‘Identity’
25 We start by drawing a distinction between numerical, qualitative, and narrative
identity.
Numerical Identity. A and B are identical in this sense if and only if A and B
are the very same object or person. So, for example, Theresa May is numerically
identical with the woman who became British Prime Minister in July 2016 and
30 what this means is that ‘they’ (May and the woman who became Prime
Minister) are one and the same woman, not merely two similar women.91
Qualitative Identity. On a strict definition, A and B are ‘qualitatively identical’
if and only if they share all of the same properties or qualities. One obvious
response to this is to point out that it is rarely, if ever, the case that two distinct
35 objects are exactly the same, because there will always be small differences. If we
90 President’s Council on Bioethics, Reproduction and Responsibility: The Regulation of New Biotechnologies
(PCBE, 2004) 109 (emphasis in original).
91 Aristotle, Topics, 103a6-103a38B; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (WLC Books,
1690) ch 27.
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start also to consider objects’ relational properties (how they are related to
other objects in the universe) and their spatiotemporal properties (where and
when they are) it is tempting to conclude that, for A and B to be qualitatively
identical, they must also be numerically identical, a thesis known as the
5 Identity of Indiscernibles.92 An alternative then would be to understand
qualitative identity more pragmatically as extreme similarity; many pairs of so-
called ‘identical twins’ would meet this less exacting standard.93
Finally, Narrative Identity, Self-Conception, or ‘Sense of Self’ are psychological
phenomena, but ones with potential ethical significance:
10 Another relevant sense of identity or self is a psychological, not numerical, sense. It
consists of the properties or qualities that an individual considers important to who
he is, to what kind of person he is, to what properties of himself he identifies with.94
B. Mitochondrial Replacement and Numerical Identity
If numerical identity is used to distinguish nuclear genetic modification from
15 MRTs, the underpinning claim must be that reproductive technologies which
alter the nuclear genome (often) result in a numerically different person
coming into being, whereas MRTs (typically) do not. However, this argument
is flawed. For it is not clear that the distinction between identity-affecting and
non-identity-affecting interventions maps onto a clear ethical line. Nor is it
20 obvious that nuclear modification is identity-affecting while MRTs are not. In
what follows we look at each of these points in turn.
(i) Is the Distinction between Identity-affecting and Non-identity-affecting
Interventions Ethically Significant?
If the distinction between identity-affecting and non-identity-affecting inter-
25 ventions is ethically significant, its significance is neither obvious nor
straightforward, and identity-affecting interventions are certainly not always
wrong or problematic. Imagine that Amelia is planning to use Bobby as a
sperm donor. Shortly before donation occurs she discovers that he carries a
serious genetic condition; his offspring will suffer from painful and life-
30 shortening disease. Amelia therefore uses another sperm donor instead:
Callum, who has no known heritable diseases. In this case, Amelia has
changed the (numerical) identity of her future child. She was going to have a
92 Leibniz writes that ‘ . . . it is never true that two substances are entirely alike, differing only in being two
rather than one’. Gottfried von Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics (St Martin’s Press, 1988) s 9.
93 As Bredenoord and others put it: ‘Identical twins may be qualitatively identical, meaning they are exactly
alike. Numerically, though, they are different: they are two different persons.’ Annelien L Bredenoord and others,
‘Ethics of Modifying the Mitochondrial Genome’ (2011) 37 J Med Ethics 97-100, 98.
94 We do not attempt here to separate out Narrative Identity, Self-Conception, or ‘Sense of Self ’. It may be
that these are subtly different things but, for the present, we are grouping them together because they seem to be
doing essentially the same work in the mitochondrial replacement debate. Dan Brock, ‘Human Cloning and our
Sense of Self ’ (2002) 296 Science 314-316.
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child with Bobby’s sperm but instead used Callum’s. A different child ensues,
one with a much lower risk of genetic disorder. Many would not think of
Amelia’s action as wrong, nor that it is made worse by her child’s (numerical)
identity being altered.95 Furthermore, other similarly identity-affecting deci-
5 sions, such as postponing reproduction until one has completed a degree, or
moved house, or because of possible exposure to the Zika virus, are ubiquitous
and generally regarded as prudent and morally permissible. So, even if nuclear
genetic modification were identity-affecting, that would not necessarily make it
wrong, or worse than MRTs.
10 There may however be more subtle ethical differences. One is that whereas
non-identity-affecting interventions can directly benefit, cure, or harm deter-
minate future individuals, identity-affecting ones cannot. When a reproductive
technology is not identity-affecting and yet has some effect on the future
person (for example, if it prevents a genetic disorder) that person (once she
15 exists) can look back upon the intervention and see that she has directly
benefitted. It is not so clear however that the same can be said of identity-
affecting interventions because the alternative to life with a disorder in such
cases is non-existence, not life without a disorder.96 Similar reasoning might
lead one to think that (some) reproductive interventions not affecting identity
20 can be therapeutic, or at least quasi-therapeutic, in the sense that a determinate
(future) person is caused not to have a disease. This does not however apply to
identity-affecting interventions. These do not cure anyone. Rather, they involve
choosing between possible future persons and ‘screening out’ ones with disease.
They are selective reproduction rather than therapy.
25 Whether this distinction between therapy and selective reproduction is
ultimately ethically significant is beyond the scope of this work. For the
present, we merely note that it does open up an interesting line of argument
which could be used to differentiate some reproductive technologies from
others: in this case, nuclear genetic modification from MRTs.97 As noted
30 earlier, the idea of therapy also plays a justificatory role in legal and policy
debates: against the backdrop of the relevant international statements and
conventions in which the goal of treatment is at least acknowledged to be a
positive one, in the UK the HFEA, the DH and the NCoB all refer to MRTs
as treatment or therapy (a position rejected by the US IOM as regards the
35 future child).98
95 Some would go further and say that her decision is morally praiseworthy, or even obligatory, because
avoiding disease and suffering is a good thing. Eg Julian Savulescu, ‘Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should
Select the Best Children’ (2001) 15 Bioethics 413-426; Stephen Wilkinson, Choosing Tomorrow’s Children: the
Ethics of Selective Reproduction (OUP, 2010) 90-96.
96 Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (Penguin, 1977) 51-53; Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons
(Oxford University Press, 1986) 358.
97 For an interesting discussion see eg Pilar Ossario, ‘Inheritable Genetic Modifications: Do We Owe Them to
Our Children?’ in Audrey Chapman and Mark Frankel (eds), Designing Our Descendants: The Promises and Perils of
Genetic Modifications (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003) 253-271.
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Furthermore, concerns about eugenics and human dignity may be thought to
engage more powerfully when interventions are selective rather than thera-
peutic.99 This kind of view can be found, for example, in the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 3 (‘Right to the integrity
5 of the person’) of which states: ‘In the field of medicine and biology, the
following must be respected in particular . . . the prohibition of eugenic
practices, in particular those aimed at the selection of persons.’100 There are of
course many complex questions about what eugenics is and about its normative
status.101 However, the general point that the selection or deselection of
10 (possible future) persons can be seen as eugenic, since it is effectively an
instance of ‘selective breeding’, is one that people on all sides could accept.102
(ii) Is Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy or Selective Reproduction?
The argument that MRTs are less ethically problematic than modifying the
nuclear genome, because only the latter is seriously identity-affecting, could
15 only work however if (all or most) genetic modifications of nuclei were identity-
affecting while (all or most) instances of mitochondrial replacement were not.
Is this plausible? There are two reasons for thinking not. First, some practices
termed ‘mitochondrial replacement’ may themselves be identity-affecting.
Second, it may be possible to modify a cell nucleus without altering the
20 resultant person’s (numerical) identity. Therefore, the distinction between
identity-affecting and non-identity-affecting does not line up in a neat or
systematic way with the nuclear/mitochondrial distinction.
As noted earlier, Wrigley and others have plausibly argued that, at least in
practice, MST (one kind of MRT) will be identity-affecting because it causes a
25 different sperm to be used at fertilisation.103 There may also be scenarios in
which the decision to use PNT (the other kind of MRT) is identity-affecting.
98 Some of the academic debate has also coalesced around this subtopic of whether mitochondrial
replacement is therapy or reproductive (de)selection. Rulli (criticizing Arthur Caplan) makes the point as follows:
‘ . . . Caplan states that the procedure ‘‘is not without its risks, but it’s treating a disease. These little embryos,
these are people born with a disease,’’ he says. ‘‘[T]hey can’t make power. You’re giving them a new battery.
That’s a therapy. I think that’s a humane ethical thing to do.’’ This is an inaccurate picture of the procedure. The
technology would not treat a child born with mitochondrial disease; the whole point of the technology is that a
child would be born without this disease at all.’ Rulli (n 26) 41.
99 Callum MacKellar, ‘Should Persons Affected by Mitochondrial Disorders Not be Brought into Existence?’
(2014) 736 Bionews, http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_385343.asp, last accessed 31 May 2017; Stephen
Wilkinson and Eve Garrard, Eugenics and the Ethics of Selective Reproduction (Keele University, 2013)
https://www.keele.ac.uk/media/keeleuniversity/ri/risocsci/eugenics2013/Eugenics%20and%20the%20ethics%
20of%20selective%20reproduction%20Low%20Res.pdf, last accessed 31 May 2017.
100 2012/C 326/02.
101 Arthur Caplan, Glen McGee and David Magnus, ‘What is Immoral about Eugenics?’ (1999) 319 BMJ
1284-5; Jonathan Glover, Choosing Children: Genes, Disability and Design (OUP, 2006); Stephen Wilkinson,
‘‘‘Eugenics Talk’’ and the Language of Bioethics’ (2008) 34 J Med Ethics 467-471; Wilkinson and Garrard (n
99).
102 That said, even curative interventions might be thought of as having eugenic aims if part of their purpose
is ‘improving the genes’ of future generations – but then the same can be said of many interventions (medical or
otherwise) that affect future generations.
103 Wrigley and others (n 25) 635. See also Ce´sar Palacios-Gonza´lez, ‘Mitochondrial Replacement
Techniques: Egg Donation, Genealogy and Eugenics’ (2016) 34 Monash Bioethics Review 37-51.
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Imagine, for example, the choice between having a child through sexual
reproduction versus having a child via IVF and PNT. The chances of the very
same egg and spermatozoon coming together at fertilisation in both scenarios
are miniscule and even the decision to use IVF could mean that a different
5 person comes to exist, because of that decision’s effects on the timing of
conception. But this should come as no surprise for, as has been noted,
reproductive decisions affecting numerical identity are ubiquitous. So the
attempt to defend MRTs by arguing that they do not (while nuclear genetic
modification does) alter (numerical) identity fails. For at least some forms of
10 mitochondrial replacement are identity-affecting; indeed, possibly they all are if
we take a wider-context view of the matter and consider not just the technique
itself but the position of people who are choosing whether to use IVF and
MRTs in the first place.104
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that some instances of nuclear
15 genetic modification may not be identity-affecting. The leading examples here
are ones in which nuclear genetic modification makes only a trivial differ-
ence.105 Imagine, for example, that scientists alter the nuclear genome of an
embryo with the only consequence being that the resultant person’s fingers are
one millimetre longer. Ought we to say that this person is numerically
20 different? No – for two reasons. First, the qualitative change is minor and
superficial and does not (ex hypothesi) affect important personal characteristics.
Second, intuitively we would want to say that an embryo can survive this small
degree of change – that the embryo is altered, not destroyed-and-replaced. The
embryo can carry on being (numerically) the same embryo as it was before the
25 intervention – just as an adult might carry on being the same person (and the
same organism) despite having an organ removed or replaced.106
C. Mitochondrial Replacement and Qualitative Identity
MRTs will undoubtedly affect ‘qualitative identity’:
[M]odification of the mtDNA is likely to change the (qualitative) identity of the
30 future person . . . a person without a mtDNA disease will have a different life
experience, a different biography and perhaps also a different character.107
However, given the meaning of ‘qualitative identity’, this is hardly a surprising
claim. If ‘qualitative identity’ is defined stringently, as Bredenoord and others
do (they use the expression ‘exactly alike’) then pretty much anything we ever
104 Liao (n 26) agrees with us, though for different reasons, and his position is ‘stronger’. He argues that
‘MRTs create a new and numerically distinct child’ because ‘the enucleation process involved in MST and PNT
permanently disrupts the cellular or organismic continuity in an egg or zygote’.
105 Nicola Williams, ‘Possible Persons and the Problem of Prenatal Harms’ (2013) 17 J Ethics, 355-385;
Clark Wolf, ‘Do Future Persons Presently have Alternate Possible Identities?’ in Melinda Roberts and David
Wasserman (eds) Harming Future Persons (Springer, 2009) 93-114.
106 See also Liao (n 26) who disagrees on this point.
107 Bredenoord and others (n 93) 99.
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do to a person will affect qualitative identity. As such, the claim that
modification of the mitochondrial genome affects qualitative identity is almost
trivially true. But even if one takes a broader view of qualitative identity and
sees it as merely extreme similarity, MRTs will still affect qualitative identity.
5 For the difference between having and not having a mitochondrial disorder is
often huge.
So MRTs alter qualitative identity, but this is not surprising. For this reason,
we question whether ‘qualitative identity’ is a very helpful expression. It might
be clearer and more informative to talk instead just about altering character-
10 istics or properties. The problem with labelling such changes ‘identity-
affecting’ is that it encourages people to think that something more is being
claimed than is really the case. If all that is being claimed is that the
characteristics of the person are affected, then why not just use the language of
altering characteristics or properties?
15 Having noted these concerns about language, what about the substantive
ethical issue? Does the fact that MRTs ‘affect qualitative identity’ have any
ethical or legal implications?
There is not in general anything morally troubling about altering qualitative
identity. What matters, as the NCoB pointed out in 2012, is not so much
20 whether it has been altered but how:
Many medical treatments and interventions are intended to improve a person’s health
(and thus will change their qualitative identity) compared to their identity had the
treatment or intervention not been used. The important ethical question is whether
changing the person’s qualitative identity is likely to adversely affect them.108
25 Bredenoord and others suggest that one implication of all this is that it is hard
to draw an ethical distinction between nuclear and mitochondrial interventions
and they are clearly right that there is no categorical difference (as far as
identity is concerned) between modifying nuclear DNA and modifying
mtDNA; both alter qualitative identity.109 However, there may be other
30 subtler differences.
One is this. Nuclear ‘genome editing’ potentially allows people to manipulate
with considerable precision important personal characteristics, including signifi-
cant aspects of behaviour, mind, and personality. But this is not true of MRTs.
The latter may have a huge bearing on people’s lives – but crucially this impact
35 is not controlled and targeted to anything like the same degree as that of some
conceivable forms of nuclear genetic modification.110 This may be ethically
significant insofar as the ability precisely to control the makeup of future
108 NCoB (2012) (n 9) 53.
109 Bredenoord and others (n 93) 99.
110 Bredenoord and others suggest that when a child ‘inherit[s] a manipulated genome’ this ‘can be perceived
as a violation of its genetic integrity’. Annelien Bredenoord, Guido Pennings and Guido de Wert, ‘Ooplasmic and
Nuclear Transfer to Prevent Mitochondrial DNA Disorders: Conceptual and Normative Issues’ (2008) 14 Hum
Reprod Update 669-678, 674.
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persons connects with longstanding concerns about ‘designing’ babies.
Furthermore, such manipulative power could more easily be extended
beyond mere disease-avoidance to enhancement. This is possible with mito-
chondrial replacement, but seems much less probable because of the relative
5 lack of fine-grained control that MRTs provide.111
A further difference between nuclear genome editing and MRTs is that the
former has the potential to introduce into future people characteristics that are
fully ‘designed’ or ‘artificial’, unlikely ever to occur naturally. However, this is
not true of current MRTs, which involve importing a naturally occurring
10 mitochondrial genome ‘lock, stock and barrel’. We might therefore think that
while nuclear genome editing is genetic modification, mitochondrial replace-
ment is selective reproduction. We alluded to this distinction during the earlier
discussion of the Non-Identity Problem, but here it does different work. The
idea is that selective reproduction is liable to be safer and less ethically
15 troubling because it involves merely choosing between gametes, embryos, or
mitochondrial genomes, all of which already exist ‘in nature’ and could easily
have gone on to play a role in ‘natural’ reproduction in any event.112 We saw
earlier that this line of argument – and with it the distinction between
‘replacement’ and ‘modification’ – constituted a second theme of the legal and
20 policy debate, both in the UK and the US.
What ethical significance this has is far from clear, although it may have
some. One way of understanding it is as an appeal to the intrinsic superiority of
‘the natural’ over ‘the artificial’ but, for reasons that have been extensively
rehearsed elsewhere, any such appeal is doomed to fail.113 More promisingly,
25 we may understand it as a claim about risk: that selecting between naturally
occurring materials is less dangerous than modifying things at a genetic level.
Clearly there is no necessary connection between the selection/modification
distinction and levels of risk; we can imagine selection technologies with dire
effects, and conversely benign forms of genetic modification. But perhaps there
30 is some contingent link between the two inasmuch as most known forms of
selection (choosing between gamete donors, or between embryos, for example)
have quite limited and slow effects on the ‘gene pool’, whereas the genetic
modification of embryos could have more dramatic effects. So there may be
111 Human enhancement is a complex and controversial topic and not one on which we can take a view here.
See eg Nicolas Agar, Liberal Eugenics: In Defence of Human Enhancement (Blackwell, 2004); Nick Bostrom,
‘Human Genetic Enhancements: A Transhumanist Perspective’ (2003) 37 J Value Inq 493-506; Glover (n 101);
Jonathan Glover, What Sort of People Should There Be? Genetic Engineering, Brain Control, and Their Impact on Our
Future World (Penguin, 1984); John Harris, Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better People
(Princeton University Press, 2007).
112 Christopher Gyngell, Thomas Douglas and Julian Savulescu, ‘The Ethics of Germline Gene Editing’
(2016) J Appl Philos doi:10.1111/japp.12249.
113 Julian Baggini, Making Sense: Philosophy Behind the Headlines (OUP, 2002) 4.
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grounds for taking a more cautious approach to nuclear genetic modification,
given that the scale and scope of the risks are greater.
D. Mitochondrial Replacement and Narrative Identity
Identity in this third sense is intuitively more closely bound up with ethical
5 issues than either numerical or qualitative identity. As DeGrazia puts it:
Most people, most of the time, do not think much about numerical identity. People
think more often about their narrative identity. This involves an individual’s self-
conception: her most central values, implicit autobiography, and identifications with
particular people, activities, and roles.114
10 So what ethical issues does this generate and how do these apply when
considering interventions (such as MRTs) which impact directly – not on
existing people – but only on the eggs and embryos which may go on to become
people?
Narrative identity is easiest to understand when applied to the core case:
15 existing adults with mental capacity. We start therefore with this and work back
to reproduction. If we think about what might be wrong with modifying an
existing adult’s narrative identity, three main kinds of worry emerge: that
changes take place without valid consent; that changes cause or constitute
inauthenticity; that changes are harmful. Only the last of these applies directly to
20 human reproduction.
Concerns about consent cannot apply because the relevant person does not
exist yet and so does not have an opinion. In addition, as Gyngell and others
note, it is not clear ‘why the consent of future generations should be seen as
vital for decisions involving GGE [germline gene editing] but not for other
25 major decisions with long term effects’, such as environmental policy or the
decision to allow (or not) the development of new communications
technologies.115 Such decisions must always be made by reference to
something other than the desires, wishes, or consent of the affected person.116
Some may argue that we can appeal instead to hypothetical consent. On this
30 view, the position of the future person is like that of the existing child in the
following scenario:
A parent is concerned to have her beloved child vaccinated against a deadly and/or
debilitating disease. As the child unhappily resists, the parent comforts herself (and
perhaps even the child) with the thought that later on, if and when he is more
35 mature, more thoughtful, and more adequately informed about health matters, the
adult that the child becomes will endorse what the parent has done and will consent to
114 David DeGrazia, ‘Enhancement Technologies and Human Identity 1’ (2005) 30 J Med Philos 261-283,
266.
115 Gyngell and others (n 112).
116 Obviously we must also consider the need, in reproductive cases, to procure valid consent from the
prospective parents and any third-party donors, but this is a quite different kind of issue.
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comparable measures that might be needed to maintain or enhance the immunity this
established.117
This may be a useful heuristic perhaps but, in reproductive cases, appealing to
hypothetical consent does not add much to what we would (or should) do in
5 any event: that is, have regard for the welfare of the child.118 For what grounds,
other than welfare, could there be for thinking that he or she will come to
endorse (or not) a decision to use MRTs? The main one must be that, all
things considered, MRTs were good/bad for him/her.119 Of course things are
more complex than that because there are various ways in which parents or
10 society may influence a future child’s beliefs and values, such that s/he is made
retrospectively to be ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ MRTs.120 But this added complexity just
further diminishes the reliability of hypothetical consent and suggests that
basing decisions on speculation about the beliefs of possible future people in
15, 20, or 30 years’ time is unwise. It would be better instead to make the best
15 possible estimate of health and welfare, noting that even this is tremendously
difficult. So concerns about consent do not engage in the reproductive case.
Much the same goes for inauthenticity. The main concern here is not that
people are literally caused to become someone else, but rather that they are
changed in ways which are inconsistent with their ‘true selves’ or ‘authentic
20 values’. While there is much to be said about what ‘authenticity’ is, we do not
address this here, since there are some general and fundamental reasons why
inauthenticity arguments do not engage.121 Foremost amongst these is the fact
that, when discussing the modification or selection of gametes or early
embryos, there is no true self and there are no values to be altered in ‘inauthentic’
25 ways. This is not to say that there are no ethical objections to controlling or
‘designing’ future people’s characteristics.122 It is not even to deny that
embryos have significant moral status. For even those who ascribe significant
moral status to embryos will struggle to make sense of their having the sort of
‘true self ’ about which there could be authenticity-concerns. Or indeed, if
30 embryos did already have ‘true selves’, how could we know what they were like
117 Arthur Kuflik, ‘Hypothetical Consent’ in Franklin Miller and Alan Wertheimer (eds), The Ethics of
Consent: Theory and Practice (OUP, 2010) 131-162, 132.
118 Our approach to hypothetical consent in these cases then is like that described by Kuflick, as follows:
‘What relevance hypothetical consent might have is entirely parasitic upon other claims that must be defended
more directly in any event. Once these claims are plausibly in view, the appeal to hypothetical consent is
superfluous’. Kuflik (n 117) 134.
119 In cases where numerical identity is affected, things are more complex. But still we may ask: will the
intervention result in a child who is ‘better off ’ than the alternative (possible future) child would have been? This
in in effect just an ‘impersonal’ version of the very same welfare question.
120 Jackie Leach Scully, ‘A Mitochondrial Story: Mitochondrial Replacement, Identity and Narrative’ (2017)
Bioethics 37-45.
121 Carl Elliott, A Philosophical Disease: Bioethics, Culture and Identity (Routledge, 1999); Alessandro Ferrara,
Reflective Authenticity (Routledge, 1998); Charles Guignon, On Being Authentic (Routledge, 2004); Charles
Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge University Press, 1989); Somogy Varga,
Authenticity as an Ethical Ideal (Routledge, 2011).
122 See eg Michael Sandel, The Case against Perfection (Harvard University Press, 2007).
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and so which changes would or would not make them more or less ‘authentic’?
We conclude therefore that authenticity arguments do not engage either.123
That just leaves the suggestion that some changes may have harmful effects
on narrative identity. The question of how MRTs will affect future people’s
5 narrative identities is a complex empirical matter with any claims made being
highly speculative. That said, and crucially for the concerns of this paper, the
case for assuming any kind of systematic connection between – (a) the extent
to which future narrative identity will be adversely affected and (b) whether a
modification is nuclear or merely mitochondrial – appears weak. This is because,
10 as noted earlier, one can imagine relatively trivial forms of nuclear genetic
modification, or ones which precisely target a specific disease, not having a
significant effect on narrative identity. In such cases, the resultant person either
may not care at all about their having been ‘modified’ or may understand this
as on a par with childhood vaccination. Conversely, being one of the first MRT
15 babies in the world could have a psychological impact on self-conception that is
just as significant as being one of the first ‘genome-edited’ children.
In a recent paper on this topic, Jackie Leach Scully asks how MRTs might
impact upon narrative identity. She discusses various challenges for MRT
children. As a new and unusual social group, they may lack a clear origin-
20 narrative, or their sense of self may be adversely affected by media coverage.124
Another factor, one shared with ‘regular’ donor-conceived children, but not
interestingly with ‘genetically modified children’, is the existence of the donor:
Perhaps the child’s emerging sense of self could in some way become confused
through knowing that a third person was involved in their conception, unlike their
25 peers; children might not be able to understand why the mitochondrial donor is not
included in family events and communications; tensions may develop, if the child
wants more information about the mitochondrial donor than parents are able or
willing to provide.125
For these reasons, MRTs are not necessarily in a better position than nuclear
30 genetic modification. Yet neither is the opposite something that we can take for
granted because one can also imagine specific narrative identity problems
emerging in the case of ‘genetically modified children’: fears about them being
‘designed’, ‘artificial’, or even ‘polluting the gene pool’. So it is possible to
imagine problems regarding narrative identity for both MRTs and nuclear
35 genetic modification. This suggests that there is as yet (and pending further
123 For the reasons given here, inauthenticity-arguments may have more traction when applied to therapies
(genetic or otherwise) for existing people (especially those who have lived long enough to develop an ‘authentic’
self) than they do in the reproductive context. See eg Felicitas Kraemer, ‘Authenticity or Autonomy? When Deep
Brain Stimulation Causes a Dilemma’ (2013) 39 J Med Ethics 757-760; Felicitas Kraemer, ‘Authenticity
Anyone? The Enhancement of Emotions via Neuro-psychopharmacology’ (2011) 4 Neuroethics 51-64.
124 Scully (n 120) 40.
125 Ibid.
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empirical studies on MRT children) no strong narrative identity argument for
treating MRTs more favourably than nuclear genetic modification.
E. Conclusions
Are MRTs less troubling than interventions altering the nuclear genome,
5 because they influence to a lesser extent the identities of future people?
Regarding numerical identity, no clear difference between MRTs and nuclear
genome modification was found. Each has the capacity to be identity-affecting,
depending on the context, extent, and nature of the procedure; conversely,
each could conceivably be used in ways that do not alter numerical identity.
10 Something similar goes for qualitative identity; both mitochondrial and
nuclear interventions would affect this. We did however find that nuclear
genome editing may be different from MRTs in some relevant ways. One is
that, compared to MRTs, nuclear genome editing provides an ability to
manipulate with considerable precision important characteristics. Another is that
15 nuclear genome editing has greater potential to introduce characteristics that
are fully ‘designed’ or ‘artificial’, and unlikely to occur naturally. These
differences might serve partially to justify the suggestion that nuclear genome
editing is more dangerous than MRTs and that therefore a more precautionary
approach towards nuclear genetic modification is warranted. Nevertheless, two
20 caveats must be stressed. First, it is only a pragmatic argument, not a
categorical difference between nuclear and mitochondrial. Second, whether this
argument should be classified as a concern about identity is doubtful. Really the
worry here is about the technology generating adverse outcomes and about its
going beyond therapy towards enhancement and ‘designer babies’.126 Neither of
25 these objections need appeal to the notion of identity.
Finally, we concluded that, regarding narrative identity, there is no clear
difference between the mitochondrial and nuclear genomes. Interventions in
either may or may not be problematic.
5. Conclusions
30 This paper has considered the uses and meanings of the term ‘germline genetic
modification’ in the UK and US legal and policy debates and has evaluated the
underlying ethical concerns about ‘identity’.
126 In its 2017 report (n 9) the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine states, in
Recommendation 5.1: ‘Clinical trials using heritable germline genome editing should be permitted only within a
robust and effective regulatory framework that encompasses: the absence of reasonable alternatives; restriction to
preventing a serious disease or condition . . .’ amongst a list of other criteria (emphasis added). Recommendation 6.1
states: ‘Regulatory agencies should not at this time authorize clinical trials of somatic or germline genome editing
for purposes other than treatment or prevention of disease or disability.’ (Emphasis added.) The report observes,
147: ‘Significant scientific progress will be necessary before any genome-editing intervention for indications other
than the treatment or prevention of disease or disability can satisfy the risk/benefit standards for initiating a clinical
trial.’ (Ibid, emphasis added.) It urges ‘robust public discussion’ regarding non-therapeutic purposes, ibid.
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Its analysis has shown that the broadly prohibitive international position
regarding germline genetic modification is best understood as relating to the
nuclear genome and that the concerns in this context relate principally to
worries regarding ‘artificial’ changes to ‘identity’, as well as about ‘dignity’,
5 consent, human enhancement, and safety. A central move in the UK and US
debates has been to demarcate a clear boundary between the mitochondrial
genome and the nuclear genome and to emphasize the latter’s more significant
role in determining personal characteristics and traits. Similarly, replacing one
mitochondrial genome with another ‘naturally occurring’, ‘donated’ one has
10 been contrasted with, and presented as more innocuous than, ‘altering’,
‘editing’, or ‘modifying’ the nuclear genome (again for reasons, in part, to do
with these interventions’ potential to determine identity).
The question of how much normative significance these distinctions have,
therefore, is important both to MRTs as a development in reproductive
15 medicine and to the now current question of whether modifications of the
nuclear genome in reproduction should be permitted. Our analysis has shown
that, as far as identity is concerned, MRTs and nuclear genome ‘editing’ are
not as different as has been supposed. It does not follow from this that they
should be treated alike, since there may be other reasons that justify different
20 legal and policy stances; these include the latter’s greater capacity for non-
therapeutic application and its greater potential to effect rapid and radical
change in the human ‘gene pool’. It does however mean that one of the central
reasons offered for treating MRTs more permissively than nuclear genetic
modification, and for not regarding MRTs as ‘germline genetic modification’,
25 is in doubt. The concept of identity cannot, by itself, do the work thus far
assigned to it, explicitly or otherwise, in policy debates, international
statements and conventions and legal positions.
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